Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States, Baghdad has repeatedly compromised, and at times caved, in response to U.S. pressure and threats. An analysis of attempts to coerce Iraq since Desert Storm reveals that military strikes and other forms of pressure that threatened Saddam Husayn's relationship with his power base proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime. When coercing Saddam or other foes, U.S. policymakers should design a strategy around the adversary's center of gravity while seeking to neutralize adversary efforts to countercoerce the United States and appreciating the policy constraints imposed by domestic politics and international alliances.
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From the Publisher:
Although Saddam Husayn's Iraq has regularly defied U.S. pressure, aclose look at recent history reveals that Baghdad has also oftenretreated in the face of U.S. threats or limited military strikes. Thismixed record illustrates many of the challenges that commonly arisewhen confronting major regional adversaries. This report seeks toderive lessons for future confrontations with Baghdad and for coer-civediplomacy in general. It examines the nature of Iraq as anadversary, U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf region, and the histori-calrecord of recent attempts to coerce Iraq. It then assesses Iraq'svulnerabilities and concludes by drawing broader implications forsuccessful coercion.This assessment is intended to inform both policymakers and indi-vidualsconcerned with the use of force in general and with PersianGulf security in particular. Policymakers can draw on this assess-mentin judging how to better coerce Iraq and how to coerce otheradversaries elsewhere in the world.This research was conducted for the Office of the Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction within the Inter-nationalSecurity and Defense Policy Center of RAND's NationalDefense Research Institute, a federally funded research and devel-opmentcenter sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies.
About the Author:
Daniel L. Byman (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. in political science) is a policy analyst at Rand.
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- PublisherRAND Corporation
- Publication date2000
- ISBN 10 0833028138
- ISBN 13 9780833028136
- BindingPaperback
- Number of pages101